Yushchenko-Yanukovych Alliance

January 15, 2010 – 7:07 am

Yushchenko and Yanukovych Forge an Electoral Alliance

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 2
January 5, 2010 04:51 PM Age: 9 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Domestic/Social, Ukraine, Featured
By: Taras Kuzio
President Viktor Yushchenko (L) and Party of Regions leader Yanukovych

On December 25, 2009 UNIAN published a secret agreement “On Political Reconciliation and the Development of Ukraine” leaked by Yaroslav Kozachok, the deputy head of the presidential secretariat’s department on domestic affairs and regional development. Kozachok resigned in protest at the secret agreement between President Viktor Yushchenko and Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych to appoint the former as Prime Minister in the event of Yanukovych’s election.

The Yushchenko and Yanukovych campaigns –not surprisingly– alleged that the document was a forgery (Ukrayinska Pravda, December 28). At the same time, its authenticity is proven by two steps undertaken by the presidential secretariat. Firstly, the presidential secretariat’s pressure on television channels not to discuss the document, which led to Kozachok complaining about the return of censorship to Ukrainian media. “It is obvious that ignoring (the document) has taken place on instructions from ‘above,’ and the system has worked to block the appearance in the mass media of information unpleasant for senior officials” (Ukrayinska Pravda, December 29).

This would not be the first occasion when direct intervention halted revelations about a secret electoral alliance between Yushchenko-Yanukovych. In December the Security Service (SBU) was instructed by the president to investigate the appearance of large billboards throughout Kyiv and other cities that had reproduced the front cover of the December 4 edition of the weekly magazine Komentarii with the headline “Yushchenko has negotiated the seat of premier.” The billboards, which showed Yushchenko and Yanukovych embracing in a pose reminiscent of the Soviet and East German leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Erich Honecker, were ordered to be taken down. The Ukrainian media complained of “censorship.”

Secondly, if the document unveiled by Kozachok was indeed a “forgery” then why did the president order the prosecutor-general to launch an investigation into the publication of a “state secret?” Yushchenko ordered a full report within ten days on how the document was leaked, while presidential secretariat head Vera Ulianchenko initiated an internal investigation of Kozachok’s employment record (Ukrayinska Pravda, December 28).

The secret agreement aims to ensure “political stability and economic development” and to end years of political in-fighting. Both sides agreed compromises based upon avoiding raising issues that are considered divisive within Ukrainian society. Yushchenko agreed not to raise rehabilitating and promoting nationalist leaders or demanding compulsory Ukrainian language tests in schools and universities. In return, Yanukovych would not advocate Russian as a second state language or call for a referendum on Ukrainian NATO membership (UNIAN, December 25). Yanukovych has downplayed his election program commitment to Russian as a state language and Yushchenko has not mentioned NATO in his program.

The next section of the secret agreement calls for Yushchenko and Yanukovych not to criticize each other. The 2010 election campaign is noticeable for the absence of criticism by Yushchenko of Yanukovych and the former’s daily accusations against Tymoshenko. Yushchenko has asked voters to stay at home and not vote in round two, arguing there is no difference between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych who will inevitably enter the February 7 run off. A low turn-out in “Orange Ukraine” would result in Yanukovych’s election, while a large voter turn-out would ensure Tymoshenko’s election since the combined “Orange” vote is larger. Yushchenko is in effect calling on his supporters to not vote negatively against Yanukovych in the second round.

Playing on Western Ukrainian, anti-Russian nationalism, Yushchenko has accused Tymoshenko of being “unpatriotic” by referring to the fact that she has only one ethnic Ukrainian parent (her Armenian father separated from her mother when she was a child). In addition, since the summer of 2008 Yushchenko has repeatedly condemned as “treasonous” Tymoshenko’s cultivation of a pragmatic economic-energy relationship with Russia that has brought her support from Western Europeans anxious to avoid another gas crisis in January. Yushchenko has appealed to Ukrainians to vote for a “Ukrainian premier” (meaning himself) who will not, allegedly unlike Tymoshenko, sell Ukraine to Russia by permitting the Black Sea Fleet to remain in Sevastopol beyond 2017, which would require a constitutional amendment that no president could undertake (Ukrayinska Pravda, January 3). Tymoshenko would also allegedly transfer Ukraine’s gas pipelines to Russia, an accusation which contradicts Tymoshenko’s mobilization of parliament in February 2007 to vote for a law banning any transfer of the pipelines from Ukrainian state control and her March 2009 agreement with the EU to modernize the pipeline infrastructure without Russian involvement.

Tymoshenko is also accused of being the “biggest threat to democracy” in Ukraine, Yushchenko has claimed (Ukrayinska Pravda, December 24). This accusation ignores the perilous state of Ukrainian democracy, as shown by recent Western and Ukrainian surveys, which reveal that Ukrainians associate democracy with “chaos” following years of instability and elite in-fighting.

The “Coalition of Political Reconciliation and Development of Ukraine” would propose Yushchenko as its candidate for prime minister. The basis of this coalition remains unexplained, since Yushchenko controls only 15 out of 72 Our Ukraine deputies.

Yushchenko has always wavered between supporting a grand coalition with the Party of Regions or a “democratic” coalition with the Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT). Following the March 2006 elections Yushchenko sent the Prime Minister (and head of Our Ukraine) Yuriy Yekhanurov to negotiate a grand coalition and Roman Besmertnyi to form a “democratic” coalition. Following the dissolution of parliament in April 2007, Yushchenko negotiated a compromise with the Party of Regions to hold pre-term elections in September in exchange for a grand coalition. During the 2007 election campaign Yushchenko campaigned for a “democratic” coalition, which was established with Tymoshenko as its candidate for prime minister in December 2007. Raisa Bohatyriova, the head of the Party of Regions parliamentary faction, was appointed as secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (NRBO) who, together with the presidential secretariat head Viktor Baloga, spent 2008 seeking to undermine the Tymoshenko government in which Yushchenko had demanded that half the cabinet posts go to Our Ukraine.

The agreement seeks a grand coalition through a Yanukovych presidency, but will again fail for the same reasons that it has in the past. Yushchenko will be unable to ensure that a parliamentary majority will vote for him: Our Ukraine deputy Oleksandr Tretiakov said that parliament would never vote for Yushchenko’s candidacy (Ukrayinska Pravda, December 15). Tymoshenko would therefore remain a constitutionally powerful prime minister under President Yanukovych.

Russian Factor in 2010 Elections

January 15, 2010 – 7:06 am

The Russian Factor in Ukraine’s 2010 Presidential Elections

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 9
January 14, 2010 09:55 AM Age: 18 hrs
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Domestic/Social, Foreign Policy, Russia, Ukraine
By: Taras Kuzio
Russian Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol, Ukraine

The Russian factor in this year’s Ukrainian presidential elections is essentially a straw man and far less important key than five years ago. Russian political technologists openly worked for one candidate (Viktor Yanukovych), while Moscow allegedly sought to poison the opposition candidate (Viktor Yushchenko) and President Vladimir Putin visited Kyiv on the eve of the first and second rounds to endorse Yanukovych. Putin congratulated Yanukovych on his “victory” two days after the second round –and one day before the central election commission had released the official results.

Mykhailo Kasianov, now in opposition but then an ally of Putin, described the Orange Revolution, the defeat of Yanukovych and election of Yushchenko as the biggest setback of Putin’s presidency (www.glavred.info, January 11).

Russian policy is now less obviously interventionist. It is highly exaggerated by Ukrainian candidates, particularly by the incumbent Yushchenko, who with single digit poll ratings is fighting for his political life. Yushchenko’s 2010 election campaign has retreated to Galicia on an anti-Russian, nationalist platform. He repeatedly labels the two front runners Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych, who will enter the second round on February 7, as a “Moscow coalition” (Ukrayinska Pravda, January 8).

Yushchenko’s anti-Russian platform will likely backfire for three reasons.

Firstly, it has already been attempted by Leonid Kravchuk in the 1994 elections and he lost in the second round by 44 percent to Leonid Kuchma’s 52 percent. In the 2010 elections, Yushchenko is not expected to enter the second round. Moreover, Ukrainian opinion polls show that over 80 percent of Ukrainians seek good relations with Russia and do not see any contradiction between Ukraine’s integration into Europe and maintaining these ties. Any candidate who campaigns on an anti-Russian platform will consequently weaken their electoral credentials. Finally, Yushchenko’s campaign is a regression from patriotism (2004) to nationalism (2010), which has shrunk his electoral appeal to Galicia from that of five years earlier when he swept the west and central Ukraine.

Yushchenko has focused on daily attacks against Tymoshenko, while ignoring Yanukovych (EDM, January 5, 6), with one theme being her allegedly close working relationship with Putin. Yushchenko claimed that President Dmitry Medvedev’s appeal represented indirect support for Tymoshenko (Ukrayinska Pravda, January 3).

The Unified Russia (UR) party has endorsed Yanukovych as its favored candidate, one reason being that it entered a cooperation agreement with the Party of Regions in 2005. “We believe that the Party of Regions mainly represents Russian-speaking voters in Ukraine who live in the east, south and central regions. These are all people who are sympathetic to Russia and want to see the development of Russian-Ukrainian relations,” said UR deputy Konstantin Zatulin (Ukrayinska Pravda, December 25).

Tymoshenko’s Fatherland Party has only cooperated with the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) group in the European Parliament and is the most active Ukrainian party in Strasbourg-Brussels. Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine is also a member of the EPP, but he has been persona non grata since 2008 after EPP leaders repeatedly criticized his attempts at undermining the Tymoshenko government. Tymoshenko –but not Yushchenko– attended the December 7, 2009 EPP meeting in Bonn where she was presented as “the future president of Ukraine” (www.tymoshenko.ua, December 9).

Yushchenko has used the Russian factor against Tymoshenko by raising three issues:

1. Claiming that she would indefinitely extend the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol. Yet, among the main candidates only Yanukovych (EDM, November 3, 2009), Serhiy Tihipko and Communist Party leader Piotr Symonenko have supported this step. In addition, no elected president can unilaterally extend the lease beyond 2017, as this would require a constitutional majority to change the constitution to no longer ban foreign bases.

2. Alleging that Tymoshenko will sell off Ukraine’s gas pipelines. In February 2007 Tymoshenko mobilized 430 (out of 450) deputies to vote for legislation that bans every form of transfer of the pipelines. In March 2009 she signed an agreement with the EU to modernize the pipelines that excluded Russia, provoking protest by Putin. Four candidates have supported a gas consortium with Russia: Yanukovych, Tihipko, Symonenko and Arseniy Yatseniuk (EDM, November 20, 2009).

3. Arguing that Tymoshenko has backtracked from NATO membership, which appears far-fetched as none of the 18 candidates –including Yushchenko– mention NATO in their 2010 programs (EDM, December 15, 2009). NATO membership is on the backburner because support for this step has not increased during Yushchenko’s presidency. Yushchenko prioritized blocking Tymoshenko’s return to the post of prime minister in 2006 over the one realistic chance of Ukraine obtaining a Membership Action Plan, Ukraine-fatigue grew from 2007 in Europe and the US, while President Barack Obama is not pursuing NATO enlargement to the same extent as the previous administration.

Within the Tymoshenko team there are NATO supporters and Kuchma-era high levels of cooperation with NATO would revive if Tymoshenko was elected. If Yanukovych is elected, NATO membership would drop from the agenda and cooperation will decline compared to the Kuchma era.

The Russian factor diminished after Yushchenko’s last pre-election press conference, which transpired as an anti-Tymoshenko speech (www.president, gov.ua, www.pl.com.ua, January 12). Yushchenko revived documents from the criminal case fabricated by Putin and Kuchma against Tymoshenko following the 2000-2001 Kuchmagate scandal to undermine her as an opposition leader. Kuchma was unsuccessful in making such charges stick; nevertheless, Tymoshenko became the only member of the Ukrainian elite who was ever imprisoned (February 2001) (Radio Free Europe, August 15, 2002).

Yushchenko argues that the “Moscow Coalition” (Tymoshenko and Yanukovych) are no different, and is calling on “patriotic Ukrainians” not to vote in the second round. Therefore, the election outcome will hinge on whether “Orange” voters will heed Yushchenko’s advice. Listening to Yushchenko would have the effect of dampening the turnout in western Ukraine and ensuring Yanukovych’s election (and possibly Yushchenko becoming prime minister). If they ignore Yushchenko’s appeal, Tymoshenko will likely be elected as Ukraine’s next president.

Which President Would You Vote For?

January 15, 2010 – 7:05 am

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/

Why Victor Yanukovych should be president

It’s important to understand that most voters in Ukraine are ruled by the faulty logic similar to one in military aviation, with its strict markings of “our own” or “enemy.”
Today at 00:17 | Vyacheslav Pikhovshek

Full story

Why Yulia Tymoshenko should be president

Ukrainians, thankfully, no longer believe in messiahs. Meanwhile, the global financial crisis, which has badly affected Ukraine, has focused the minds of voters on bread-and-butter issues. Yulia Tymoshenko is the first Ukrainian presidential candidate to be a sitting prime minister and she, unlike her domestic critics, has not shrugged from taking responsibility for combating the effects of the global crisis on Ukraine.
Today at 00:15 | Taras Kuzio

Full story

Why Sergiy Tigipko should be president

It is with great trust that I will be voting for Sergiy Tigipko. I think that today he is the only person among the presidential candidates who has come to guarantee the interests of the people, not his own.
Yesterday at 22:57 | Oleksandra Pavlenko

Full story

Why Arseniy Yatseniuk should be president

For me, Anseniy Yatseniuk is a friend I have known for virtually my whole life. It has been a breathtaking experience, to watch a close person transform from a state servant into a man aspiring to be the leader of the nation.
Yesterday at 22:51 | Andriy Pyshny

Full story

Why Victor Yushchenko should be president

Three things differentiate Victor Yushchenko from opponents in this election. They are: a record of accomplishments; an integral program for Ukraine’s future in Europe; and, a commitment to democratic values and principles.
Yesterday at 22:45 | Myron Wasylyk

Full story

Yushchenko Believes he is a Mazepa Descendant

December 6, 2009 – 6:38 pm

http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/4b1bf4125657d/

Only psychologists would be able to diagnose this phenomenon. Wonder what Freud would have said?

NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR UKAINE: DEBATE

December 5, 2009 – 10:45 am

Sponsor:          The Kyiv Post

Date:               Wednesday, December 9, 2009

Time:               9.30-10.50 AM

Venue:             Kiev Institute of International Relations

Ulitsa Mel’nikova 36/1

Moderator:      Kyiv Post journalist TBA

Speakers:         Anthony T. Salvia, American Institute in Ukraine     (5 minutes)

XXX                                                                           (5 minutes)

Debate:            James Jatras, American Institute in Ukraine               (20 minutes)

Dr.Taras Kuzio, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto                            (20 minutes)

Q & A:            Media, students and guests                                        (30 minutes)

Total time:       1.2 hours  (time allotments subject to change if KIMO officials wants to make welcoming remarks)

Theme:            Ukraine and European Security: Priorities for the Next President

The next Ukrainian president will have to set the nation’s course in world affairs in a dangerous and shifting international political environment.     Russia has made clear to Ukraine that it finds some potential policy moves unacceptable, without specifying how it would respond if Kiev were to adopt such measures, and accuses it of an unfriendly attitude; the United States, which has played an important role in Ukrainian affairs since independence, but especially since the last presidential election in 2004, faces unprecedented foreign policy challenges of its own, remains mired in economic difficulties and faces crucial mid-term elections in 2010.  Many Americans feel the US is overextended.  Partially as a consequence of this state of affairs, Washington appears keen to seek improved relations with Moscow.  As for Europe, it remains deeply and openly skeptical of Ukrainian entry into the European Union anytime soon, although such membership would be a boon to Ukraine’s economy and would anchor the nation firmly in the West.

The challenges are great, and so is the need to shed light on Ukraine’s place in world as the nation prepares to elect new leadership.

This event, at the Kiev Institute of International Relations (KIMO) of the Kiev National Taras Shevchenko University, Ukraine’s leading training ground for diplomats and foreign affairs specialists and practitioners, is intended to do just that.   As such, it will feature a debate between qualified Western experts in the these matters.

Anthony Salvia, Director of the American Institute in Ukraine, and XXX will frame the discussion with concise opening statements setting forth their competing visions for Ukraine’s foreign policy future.

These statements will be followed by the main event—a forty minutes debate between Dr. Taras Kuzio of the University of Toronto and James Jatras, Deputy Director of the American Institute in Ukraine.  Dr. Kuzio is well known in Ukraine and the West for his commentary on and analysis of Ukrainian affairs; Mr. Jatras served in the US Department of State as a Foreign Service Officer and as a senior foreign policy adviser to the Senate Republican Policy Committee.  He expertise is in Soviet and post-Soviet affairs.

Students and guests will have a chance to pose questions to the speakers in the Question and Answer session that will follow the debate.

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