Yushchenko Facilitates Yanukovych’s Election and Buries the Orange Revolution
February 17, 2010 – 2:07 pmPublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 31
February 16, 2010 08:04 AM Age: 1 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Domestic/Social, Ukraine, Home Page
By: Taras Kuzio
President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko
Two major myths promoted by President Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine’s 2010 presidential elections were that there was no difference in policies between the two main candidates, Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko, and that both were “pro-Russian.” These myths helped defeat Tymoshenko by 3 percent in an election where every vote counted.
Several pieces of evidence point to the Yushchenko-Yanukovych alliance that facilitated Yanukovych’s election. For instance, the lack of criticism by Yushchenko of Yanukovych preceding the elections (Ukrayinska Pravda, February 10). Yushchenko never criticized Yanukovych’s pro-Russian policies on energy (gas consortium, return to non-market subsidized prices, and revival of the corrupt RosUkrEnergo); Russian as a state language; the extension of the Black Sea Fleet base beyond 2017; opposition to NATO membership, and the Party of Regions alliance with Russian extremist nationalists in Odessa and the Crimea. Yushchenko and the presidential secretariat levelled daily abuse at Tymoshenko, accusing her of “treason” and vetoed a record number of government policies.
Moreover, a draft agreement was leaked in December 2009 by a staff member in the presidential secretariat that revealed plans for a Yushchenko-Yanukovych alliance (UNIAN, December 25, 2009; EDM, January 5, 6). The Ukrainian media discussed the issue of Yushchenko becoming prime minister under President Yanukovych (www.comments.com.ua, December 4, 2009).
In the event of a Our Ukraine-Peoples Self Defence (NUNS) – Party of Regions grand coalition being formed, the Yushchenko loyalist Yuriy Yekhanurov might be offered the post of prime minister (Ukrayinska Pravda, February 8-10). Prime Minister and Our Ukraine leader Yekhanurov led the negotiations with the Party of Regions after the March 2006 elections for a grand coalition that collapsed. Yekhanurov was the head of the State Property Fund in the 1990’s and the oligarchs are his creation.
The Party of Regions and the NUNS faction, together with the Communists and Volodymyr Lytvyn bloc, sought to remove pro-Tymoshenko Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko. The vote was supported by NUNS deputy Petro Yushchenko. Similarly, between rounds one and two Yushchenko vetoed the cabinet’s December 16, 2009 decree appointing General Hennady Moskal as Crimea’s police chief (UNIAN, February 2). Moskal, who is a deputy in the pro-Lutsenko Peoples Self Defense group in NUNS, was praised for halting election fraud in favor of Yanukovych in round one. “The Party of Regions, who is as thick as thieves with Yushchenko, controls the administrative resources on the peninsula,” Moskal said (www.zik.com.ua, February 11). The Tymoshenko campaign found evidence of fraud in the Crimea in round two (www.vybory.tymoshenko.ua, February 10).
Meanwhile, between rounds one and two Yushchenko removed the Kharkiv and Dniproptrovsk governors who had expressed support for Tymoshenko and had refused to provide administrative resources for Yanukovych’s campaign. Yushchenko also removed six ambassadors where there had been few votes for Yushchenko in round one (Ukrayinska Pravda, February 10). The Tymoshenko campaign will contest in the courts the election results in the Crimea, Donetsk, Zaporozhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk (www.vybory.tymoshenko.ua, February 10).
Only five days before the second round the Party of Regions, the pro-Yanukovych wing of NUNS and the Communists, passed changes to the election law. President Yushchenko quickly signed the law, ignoring a plea to veto it by the Committee of Voters (www.cvu.org.ua, February 4), independent experts, and Tymoshenko (Ukrayinska Pravda, February 3, 4).
These changes were widely condemned because they changed the electoral rules in the middle of the elections. If the changes were deemed so important, they should have been demanded by Yushchenko prior to round one. Yushchenko’s actions proved that he had forged an alliance with Yanukovych, Kyiv expert Volodymyr Fesenko said (www.politdumka.kiev.ua, February 4).
What was left of Yushchenko’s reputation, in Ukraine and abroad, was effectively destroyed by his support for the electoral law changes, because they undermined his role as the constitutional guarantor of free elections and his election campaign slogan of having brought democracy to Ukraine, Kyiv expert Ihor Zhdanov said (www.politdumka.kiev.ua, February 4). Oleksandr Tretiakov, a long time ally, resigned from the Our Ukraine party in which Yushchenko is its honorary chairman.
Most controversially, between the election rounds Yushchenko signed two decrees giving hero status to Organization of Ukrainian Nationalist leader Stepan Bandera and to honor members of various Ukrainian national liberation movements in the twentieth century (www.president.gov.ua, January 28). The decrees, immediately condemned by Russia, helped to additionally mobilize pro-Yanukovych voters in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Professor Myroslav Popovych claimed the decrees “disorientated” Eastern-Southern Ukrainian voters and mobilized them against the “Orange” candidate, Tymoshenko (Ukrayinsky Tyzhden, January 29-February 4).
The timing of the two decrees was odd, as they were not issued prior to round one, when they could have given Yushchenko additional nationalist votes from supporters of the Svoboda leader Oleh Tyahnybok. The decrees could have been issued at any time during his presidency, as he did with an October 2007 decree giving hero status to Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) leader Roman Shukhevych (EDM, October 23, 2007). A decree in honor of Sich Sharpshooters, a Ukrainian unit in the Austrian army in World War I, was issued on January 6 before the first round.
Finally, Yuriy Shukhevych, the son of the UPA commander, led a campaign in Lviv with other nationalist leaders in support of Yushchenko’s call to vote against both candidates in round two. Evidence was provided by Tymoshenko in an appearance on Inter television (February 5) that these appeals were published in Lviv newspapers with financial assistance from the Yanukovych campaign.
Anti-Semitic leaflets appeared in Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk (witnessed by this author) urging voters: “Do not vote for that Jew,” a reference to Tymoshenko’s father’s alleged ethnicity (the leaflet was reproduced on www.rferl.org, February 3).
The irony of Ukraine’s 2010 election campaign is that the nationalist candidate, Yushchenko, long vilified by Russia, likely facilitated the election of the pro-Russian candidate, Yanukovych, Moscow’s favourite in the Ukrainian elections (EDM, January 22, 27, 29). Yushchenko, brought to power by the 2004 Orange Revolution, effectively destroyed the Orange Revolution himself. The Revolution, long the personal object of hate by the former Russian President Vladimir Putin who saw it as one of his personal policy failures, was buried by that very person (Yushchenko) so despised by Putin.
No better final epitaph could have been written for Yushchenko.
7 Responses to “Yushchenko Facilitates Yanukovych’s Election and Buries the Orange Revolution”
I think Yulia did well, certainly better then expected. Had it not been for yushchenko she would have done much better.
Now that the presidential circus parade is over hopefully Yulia will not have lost too much credibility and she can focus the rebate back on the need for constitutional reform and for Ukraine to abandon the presidential system and embrace a European parliamentary system of governance.
Then and only then will Ukraine become an independent democratic nation.
Tymoshenko knows this is the case and has on a number of occasions hinted towards this end. If the aprlaimnet is to be dismissed and fresh elections are to be held then it should be done after implementing constitutional change.
Party of regions and bloc Tymoshenko should go back to the negotiating table and complete the mission they first started. Constitutional reform that would see Ukraine well into the future.
With Yushchenko removed from office there is still hope that Ukraine’s best interest will prevail over presidential power.
By UkrToday on Feb 17, 2010
Ukraine
Bloodless orange
Feb 11th 2010
From The Economist print edition
Ukraine’s peaceful revolution turned sour because its leader was not ruthless enough
AP
AP
FIVE years ago in Kiev, as the snow fell, rock bands played and hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated for free elections and against corruption, Ukraine seemed poised to be transformed from a post-Soviet oligarchy into a modern democracy. Yet on February 7th the disgraced loser of 2004-05, Viktor Yanukovich (pictured right), won the presidency at the second attempt—even if Yulia Tymoshenko, his opponent (pictured left), is reluctant to concede (see article).
The election result feels like an extraordinary betrayal of the orange revolution. Yet the seeds of this outcome were planted even as the orange throng triumphed. Ukraine is a case study in how to entrench the gains of revolution—and how to squander them.
Too quiet by half
The revolution was mercifully peaceful; but it wasn’t free. On the contrary, like all such upheavals it was hugely costly, not only or principally in money. Viktor Yushchenko, the now-outgoing president, was swept to power but incurred heavy debts: to his allies, chief among them Ms Tymoshenko, heroine of the orange crowds; to other politicians, such as the Socialists, with whom he cut deals; to the businessmen who bankrolled his campaign; and to his enemies, who extracted concessions in exchange for going quietly.
In office, Mr Yushchenko paid up. He made Ms Tymoshenko prime minister (a position she held twice). Alas, the qualities that had made her a formidable revolutionary proved a liability in government. She was relentlessly self-promoting, short-termist and populist, as for example when she imposed price caps on fuel. Meanwhile the Socialists were put in charge of privatisation. Unsavoury businessmen were given jobs in the presidential administration. And the “bandits” whom Mr Yushchenko had promised to punish for various crimes—not least the poisoning that disfigured him before the election of 2004 and the attempted rigging of the outcome—remained free. One of the alleged villains, Mr Yanukovich, became prime minister in 2006-07 and will now be president.
Some of this was unavoidable. Mr Yushchenko faced a chaotic and venal parliament, a messy constitution and a cadre of politicians whose view of the proper authority of any given office depends on their chances of occupying it. Some of the compromises he made were necessary, if distasteful. It would be wrong for any leader in so fragile a country as Ukraine to renege on all the pledges he makes to avoid conflict. Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia offers a good example of the opposite danger—of how what can initially seem like satisfyingly firm government can slip into over-mighty rule.
All the same, Mr Yushchenko repaid his debts too generously. Corruption among his cronies earned his administration almost as bad a reputation for graft as the regime it replaced—confirming the belief of many, especially in eastern Ukraine (Mr Yanukovich’s stronghold), that all the pre-revolutionary talk of cleaner government was so much self-serving cant. The failure to punish almost anyone for the serious crimes Mr Yushchenko had denounced, or to overhaul the courts, led to disillusion among his supporters and boldness among his enemies. The orange coalition was plagued by rivalries and contradictions, collapsing on several occasions under their own weight. Especially at the beginning, when circumstances were propitious, Mr Yushchenko should have been tougher.
Instead, his presidency was crippled by his revolutionary debts. Rather than curing the fractious pathologies of Ukrainian politics, Mr Yushchenko succumbed to them, failing to build the institutions that underpin democracy. The people and economy of Ukraine have been the losers.
It isn’t all bad. Ms Tymoshenko appears to be contesting Mr Yanukovich’s victory. Yet by recognising it, as she surely must eventually, she could still confirm what had seemed one of the revolution’s gains: (relatively) free elections, respected by the losers. And by relinquishing her post as prime minister and going into opposition, Ms Tymoshenko could help Ukraine to avoid the paralysis and in-fighting that have plagued it for the past five years. The rancorous cohabitations between her and Mr Yushchenko, and between the two Viktors, never worked. Ukraine badly needs a united government and a constructive opposition if it is finally to deal with its daunting economic problems.
And, in other ways, Ukraine remains a better and more civilised country than it was before the revolution. It has freer media and a more assertive citizenry. But those achievements have been won by the orange crowds, not by the politicians they once lionised. Peaceful revolution can be a wonderful thing. But the lesson of Ukraine is that, afterwards, their leaders need to continue the struggle.
By Taras Kuzio on Feb 18, 2010
The real struggle is to come. Tymoshenko maintain a striking position, She did better then expected in the Presidential campaign and still holds a device position in the Parliament. She is down but not knocked out.
A new governing coalition can only be formed with the support of Bloc Tymoshenko or Our Ukraine-People Self Defence (NUNS). A coalition between NUNS and Party of Regions would not be stable and NUNS will only enter into one if they are able to dictate terms. Terms that may not be acceptable to Party of Regions. If such a coalition was formed Our Ukraine would fracture and lose support.
Bloc Tymoshenko is in a position to force fresh election in October or even March next year by resigning their mandate and cancelling their election list. our Ukraine would be the loser under such circumstances.
Yanukovych can force an election now only by obtaining a vote of no confidence. If the parliament expresses no confidence in the Tymoshenko government then there is a 30 day period where the pressure is on to form a new coalition with Party of Regions. If this can n not be negotiated fresh Parliamentary elections could be held in May. If fresh elections are held all parties will lose representation. Sergei Tigipko will hold the balance of power. Constitutional majority will still be elusive. Party of regions will strengthen its position in a coalition with Tigipko but will not be able to initiate meaningful constitutional reform.
Both Party of regions and Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko were on the right track before the Presidential elections began to dominate the agenda.
The best outcome still remains a coalition of stability and constitutionality between Bloc Tymoshenko and Party of regions. A return to the negotiating table and hopefully agreement to implement a full parliamentary model of governance in line with other European States. Such a coalition would difficult and would only be predicated on Tymoshenko remaining in office. The understanding being that fresh parliamentary elections would follow and reform. Ukraine needs to put an end to the constant cycle of elections and get down to making real decisions and restructuring the things that underpin a democracy. Good governance and administration and open judiciary based on rule of law and representative government.
Until the long term interest of Ukraine become the focus of attention and the power struggle between the parliament and the head of state is put to rest Ukraine will continue to be an unstable “democratic” nation. Structural constitutional reform is first step towards laying new foundations in which to build a truly independent and democratic state. It should be the prime policy and aspiration of all political forces. A full parliamentary system of government based on equal and fair representation is the only way forward and out of the endless trap of conflict.
Democracy versus autocracy. The eternal struggle.
By UkrToday on Feb 28, 2010
UkrToday, as for me, your “eternal struggle” for “A full parliamentary system” associates with cycling (in program languages) in the “infinite loop” with no way out
BTW, I still have no answer whom do you represent signing with so pretentious nickname as “UkrToday”?
By Yuri_D on Feb 28, 2010
It is worth reading the following rulings of Ukraine’s Constitutional Court as these may gove some insight into the possible legality of the new governing coalition
1.
CCU Document Link: 12-rp-2008.doc
Summary to the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine no.12-rp/2008 dd. June 25, 2008 on the case upon a constitutional petition of 50 national deputies of Ukraine concerning compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine of Articles 13.5 and 13.6 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Status of a National Deputy of Ukraine”, Article 61.4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and official interpretation of the provisions of Articles 81.2.6, 81.6, 83.6 of the Constitution…
http://ukraineccu.wordpress.com/2008/09/01/decision-of-the-constitutional-court-of-ukraine-id-12-rp-2008-doc/
2.
CCU Document Link: 16-rp-2008.doc
Summary to the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine no.16-rp/2008 dated September 17, 2008 on the case upon the constitutional petition of 105 People’s Deputies of Ukraine concerning official interpretation of provisions of Articles 83.6, 83.7 and 83.9 of the Constitution of Ukraine (case on coalition of deputy factions in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine)
http://ukraineccu.wordpress.com/2008/09/17/decision-of-the-constitutional-court-of-ukraine-id-16-rp-2008-doc/
By UkrToday on Mar 13, 2010
Dr. Kuzio, I’ve been reading your articles (eg, Eurasia Daily Monitor and elsewhere).
Here’s something well worth reading and considering.
Stepan Bandera’s grandson has written a letter to the Kyiv Post, in which he offers a deal to Banditkovyc, in view of all of the controversy about the “Hero of Ukraine” award to Stepan Bandera.
The gist of it is the offer to trade the award for the return of Mezhihirya, the lavish 400-acre estate that Banditkovych stole from the Ukrainian governmet – with Yushchenko’s help.
It is a brilliant, brilliant letter, and it can be found here:
http://kyivscoop.blogspot.com/2010/03/deal-for-yanukovych-bandera-for.html
and you may have already seen it at the Kyiv Post:
http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/61644/
Not unexpectedly, at both sites, it has drawn absolutely epileptic fits of rage from brainwashed sovoks who were taught false sovok propaganda about Stepan Bandera.
The issue has been discussed by the European Council, Polish representatives, Russia, of course, the NY Times, the Wiesenthal Center, and all sorts of other newspapers and media.
The letter is absolutely brilliant, and serves to point out the slimy basis on which Banditkovych has started his presidency – corruption, power grab via formation of coalition in Parliament by unconstitutional law, wholesale dismissals of government workers, and worst of all – bring in all of the old Kuchma faces – Kluyev, Boiko, etc., etc., etc.
By elmer on Mar 15, 2010
Tymoshenko lost the election due to her own incompetence and selfish agenda, no one else is to blame.
By anon on Mar 27, 2010