But I also have a question on your description of BYuT’s composition. Who are the “national democrats” that along with “centrists” comprise BYuT’s base. I understand the term “Democrat” but what is the meaning of “National Democrat” is still puzzling to me. I saw the term used before and always wondered how the “democrat” can be qualified as “national” that is who are those democrats who aren’t “national democrats”?

As to BYuT – it includes both national democrats and centrists. Former UNA-UNSO leader Shkil is a member. Yushchenko’s problem is that he has pushed himself too far into a western Ukrainian defined nationalist corner and thereby losing his central Ukrainian more moderate nationalist niche. Tymoshenko has done the opposite and has to now rebuild her support in western Ukraine.
But, of them all Yatseniuk is the biggest opportunist. In 2007 he was in OU-PSD first five and his presidential election programme negates everything OU-PSD stood for.

Unfortunately, I don’t see any basis of fact in your assertion that the Orange Revolution proves the popularity of the Ukrainian nationalism among the Ukrainians. The Orange Revolution was a democratic revolution rather than a nationalist one and it succeeded thanks to the people in the Ukrainian capital like myself who held the ground for several days until Yushchenko’s supporters from other regions joined. I can assure you that we would have never taken it to the streets for the nationalist ideas but it was the election fraud that infuriated us. Had Yanukovych won the election fair and square, we would have never protested against the election outcome. And if, god forbids, he indeed wins the next election (which seems possible) there would be no strong public protests in Kiev despite Kievans in their majority would not vote for him.

I can add one more thing. The 2004 Yushchenko was a lot different from Yushchenko we know today. Back then he was doing everything possible to distance himself from the nationalists precisely because in Ukrainian politics to be perceived a nationalist is a kiss of death in the national election (it does not hurt in some regional election though). During the election campaign Yushchenko pledged to never ever close Russian schools and in his TV ad he explicitly stated that this is a local community issue. He also pledged to never interfere into the church affairs and after one particularly xenophobic speech of Mr. Tyahnybok Yushchenko expelled Tyahnybok from Nasha Ukraina parliamentary faction. From the policies pursued by Yushchenko in the office it is now clear that his inclusionist and uniter not a divider rhetoric was just as much a lie as similar election rhetoric of one well-known US politician but back then many Ukrainians were misled. Besides, we did not have much of a choice as an alternative of more years of Kuchma seemed just horrible.

Also note that despite all Yushchenko’s attempts to distance himself from the nationalist ideas that he later implemented in his policies, he still won the election by a margin of only 8 percent against the convicted criminal precisely because his opponents’ campaign to paint Yushchenko as a nationalist was partially successful and Ukrainians just do not elect the nationalist politicians.

On a side note, this is the reason of the current Tymoshenko’s success in the Ukrainian democratic camp. Unlike Yushchenko, Tymoshenko does not hold any nationalist views, which makes her electable. But back to the Orange Revolution, perhaps you were not there back then but my family was there and you might be interested to know that Maidan was Russophone for at least 2-3 days and even after that when protester from other regions joined the Maidan remained mostly Russophone because to a large degree it was still composed from Kievans most of who speak Russian in their everyday lives. The miserable performance of Mr. Tyahnybok’s party in Kiev is just another proof that nationalist ideas just do not fly among the Kievans, the very same ones who made the Orange Revolution a reality.

See also my criticism of Wilson and other russophiles on their application of nationalism to Ukraine:
http://www.taraskuzio.net/Nation%20and%20State%20Building_files/national-states.pdf

I agree that widespread anti-Russian feelings are absent in Ukraine, if one understands them as seen in the Ukrainian diaspora. But, this most people understand as anti-Russian feelings along ethnic-cultural lines. Anti-Russian criticism of Russia along territorial-state lines are more difficult to define but exist. Most Ukrainians are very critical of Russian policies to Ukraine which are done in patriotic, territorial derzhavnytske tones.

This is not different to Scotland and Ireland most of whose populations speak English. But, Scots and Irish patriots have strong criticisms about England and Britain.

On a final note, Wilson’s 1997 book Ukrainian Nationalism. A Minority Faith was undermined by the 2004 Orange Revolution that showed that Ukrainian nationalism was a majority faith. And, guess who rushed to get a book out to prove it – the same Wilson. Both him and Dominique Arel (also with same russophile views in the 1990s on Ukrainian nationalism) changed their views from around 2001 onwards when they saw that those they disparaged as “Ukrainian nationalists” were actually the main bulwark against autocracy and support for democracy in Ukraine. As seen in the Ukraine Without Kuchma, Arise Ukraine! and Orange Revolution protests.