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Empire and Path Dependency (Historical Baggage)

June 12, 2009 – 4:09 pm

When we talk about empire and path dependency we need to take into account the central issue that even moderate Ukrainians believe: Russia refuses, cannot and will not come to terms with Ukrainians as a separate people or Ukraine as an independent nation.
Imperialism, chauvinism, racism? Probably all. And, do not think I am a typical russophobe diaspornyk, as I am not. I can differentiate between people and leaders/regime.
Ukraine and Russia’s 1654 union has been compared to the 1707 union of Scotland and England. There is simply no comparison. Muscovy (Russia then) saw 1654 as Ukraine submitting itself to annexation. Ukraine saw it as a military alliance of equals. Scotland had an equal relationship with England and Scots were in the leadership of Britain (English Canada is largely Empire Loyalists fleeing the American Revolution most of whom are Lowland Scots and Ulster Scots. Canada is the only country outside Scotland with its own tartan. The GB Labour Party is run by Scots! Ukraine fared far worse than Scotland, more like Ireland within the British empire.
Remember that empires are relative. To a Breton, France was an empire. To a Frenchman, central policies in all outlying provinces was “nation-building”. To Ukrainians, Russia and the USSR were types of empires. To Russians, who believe Ukrainians are Little Russians, as Putin quoted Denikin recently, then central policies in Ukraine were not imperialist but “Russian nation building” to create a Ruskie narod from 3 eastern Slavic peoples.

Anyway, 3 pieces on this question for food of thought:

Ukrainian Intelligence Promotes Lustration in Ukraine
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35090

EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
June 12, 2009—Volume 6, Issue 113

IN THIS ISSUE
Russian intelligence intensifies its activities in Ukraine

Russia’s Ideological Crusade Against Ukraine
–Taras Kuzio

According to an interview with Ukraine’s Ambassador to Russia Konstantyn Hryshchenko, the country’s bilateral relationship with Russia has sunk to its lowest level since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, testimony to the Russian state control of the media and its ideological crusade against Ukraine (www.profil-ua.com, June 6). In the weekly Glavred magazine on May 20 its front cover declared: “Beware Ukrainophobia!”

The Levada Center recently found that 62 percent of Russians hold a negative view of Ukraine with only the United States and Georgia being seen in a worse light. At the same time, 91 percent of Ukrainians hold positive views of Russia, a reflection of media pluralism and the lack of state directed propaganda against Russia. Analyzing these polls, the head of the Center for Military-Political Research in Kyiv summarized this relationship in his headline: “We like them but they do not like us” (www.pravda.com.ua, May 5).

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) is openly raising the question of the intensification of Russian intelligence activities within Ukraine, and Russia’s return to Soviet KGB tactics. This concern was expressed in SBU chairman Valentyn Nalyvaychenko’s comment that the FSB within the Black Sea Fleet should withdraw from the Crimea (www.radiosvoboda, June 2). Nalyvaychenko explained that one of the functions of the SBU was counter-espionage, and that was why they did not agree with the FSB being based in the Fleet.

The main suspects of the murder in Odessa on April 17 of a student member of the Ukrainian nationalist NGO Sich, Maksym Chayka, belong to the “Antifa(scist)” NGO financed by the Russian nationalist Rodina party. The presidential secretariat requested that the SBU investigate their activities to discover if they are coordinated “with foreign organizations of an anti-Ukrainian orientation” (www.president.gov.ua, April 22). The SBU appealed to the justice ministry to consider if there were grounds to revoke Rodina’s registration, based on among things, their link to organized crime and financing from abroad. The suspects have fled to Russia.

The conflict between the Sich and Antifa NGO’s is historically based; specifically the controversy surrounding the unveiling of a monument to Empress Catherine in Odessa in October 2007. Ambassador Hryshchenko pointed out that unlike the constant Russian interference in Ukraine, Kyiv does not protest against Russian glorification of Tsar Peter and Tsarina Catherine -even though both are regarded very negatively in Ukraine. Ukrainian history equates both Russian leaders as the destroyers of the Ukrainian autonomous Hetmanate in the late eighteenth century and the re-organization of Ukrainian territories into gubernia, as well as the introduction of serfdom and the banning of the Ukrainian language.

The Russian foreign ministry assumes the right to condemn the unveiling of monuments to historical figures in Ukraine. For example, Ukraine will unveil a monument to Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa on Independence Day (August 24) in his home region of Poltava on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, where Ukrainian-Swedish forces were defeated by Russia. Mazepa has undergone rehabilitation as a hero in independent Ukraine, and his picture is displayed on the 10 hryvnia note.

The Russian Orthodox Church imposed an “anathema” on Mazepa and he was condemned as a “traitor” to Russian-Ukrainian unity by tsars and commissars alike. The on-going furore has led to a split within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) with Metropolitan Dmytruk, the head of the UOC’s foreign relations, supporting the growing call to remove the church’s anathema (www.pravda.com.ua, May 26).

Russia’s new historiography incorporates additional Russian chauvinists, such as White Army General Anton Denikin. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s recent reference to Denikin’s description of Russia and Ukraine as “great” and “little” Russia shows the degree to which these Russian views of Ukraine remain deep seated. Putin’s use of “little Russia” infuriated all shades of Ukrainian opinion. As Ukrainian historians pointed out, Denikin hated “Ukrainian separatism” more than he did the Bolsheviks, and this was his undoing. Denikin’s march on Moscow was foiled by uprisings in Ukraine, where his forces terrorized everything Ukrainian (www.unian.net, May 28).

Memoirs published in the West after the Russian revolution by white Russian émigrés described “Ukrainian separatism” as an “Austrian” plot against Russia. “Ukrainian separatism” in the 1990’s evolved into a “Western plot,” while two thirds of Russians in January 2005 believed that the Orange Revolution was an “American conspiracy” (see the critical review of the new anti-Ukrainian book “American Salo [pork fat]” www.unian.net, May 29).

These views of Ukraine’s “artificiality” and “fragility” remain deeply rooted within the Russian mindset, and explain the state orchestrated campaign depicting Ukraine as a “failed state” that requires international supervision. Putin described Ukraine as an “artificial” entity with lands given to it by Russia and the USSR during his speech to the NATO-Russia Council in Bucharest in April 2008. The March 16 issue of Russian political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky’s Ruskyi Zhurnal was devoted to “Will Ukraine Lose its Sovereignty?” (www.russ.ru).

Ukraine’s former Ambassador to the United States Yuriy Shcherbak, wrote a lengthy analysis of the campaign conducted by senior Russian officials. Shcherbak believes that the aim is an “ideological-propaganda preparation of a future operation for the seizure of the territory of a sovereign state” (Den, May 26).

One of the Russian officials named by Shcherbak was the director of the Institute for CIS Countries Konstantin Zatulin, who recently called upon Russia to see ethnic Russians in Ukraine “in the same rank as the army, the fleet and church” (www.russkie.org). Zatulin was again denied entry to Ukraine at Simferopol airport. The SBU spokesperson explained this by saying that Zatulin remained on a banned list of Russians entering Ukraine. More importantly, “The stance of the SBU on this question is very tough: independent of the citizenship and position held (of the person) there is no place in Ukraine for separatists and extremists” (www.pravda.com.ua, June 6).

In their rush to “reset” the button with Russia after its invasion of Georgia and Barack Obama’s election, Brussels and Washington have ignored Russia’s ideological crusade against Ukraine. They should heed the warning from Ambassador Shcherbak, who believes Russia’s ultimate aim is to “destroy Ukrainian statehood” (Den, May 26).

* The Wall Street Journal

* OPINION EUROPE
* JUNE 11, 2009

Kremlin’s Crimes
Is Russia determined to repeat its history?

By JANUSZ BUGAJSKI From today’s Wall Street Journal Europe.

As European democracies celebrate the 20th anniversary of their liberation from communism and the Soviets, Moscow seeks to restore its dominance over former satellites. Rewriting Russian history is part of this plan. The Putinist notion of a progressive Soviet system in the past is designed to provide justification for Russia’s current assertiveness in the region.

Take Moscow’s annual May 9 parade, which celebrates the “victory over fascism” on the anniversary of Nazi Germany’s surrender to the Allies. The entire exercise is based on a monumental national delusion fostered by the Kremlin. Although Russia was one of the victorious powers at the end of World War II, Moscow continues to disguise the historic record that the Soviet Union itself helped launch the war in close alliance with Nazi Germany. Through the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, Stalin schemed with Hitler to carve up Eastern Europe.

Russia has recently intensified its revisionist campaign, claiming that it voluntarily gave up communism and the Soviet Bloc and that the Cold War ended in a draw with the West. Russia’s state propagandists maintain that the USSR never occupied its neighboring states after World War II, but rather liberated them from tyranny. And they minimize the Kremlin’s imposition of a totalitarian system over the region that stifled its political and economic progress for almost half a century. Unlike post-war Germany, Moscow has never paid reparations for Soviet crimes and expropriations in Central and Eastern Europe.

Moscow also disguises the fact that Stalin murdered more Russians and other Soviet citizens than Nazi Germany. Its official figure of 27 million war dead includes several millions of Stalin’s victims during Soviet civilian deportations and military purges.

Instead of admitting that it was a perpetrator and an opportunist in the destruction of Europe, Russia, as the successor state to the Soviet Union, depicts itself as a victim and a victor.

Moscow took another step to revise its history last month when it formed a presidential inter-departmental commission to promote the Soviet version of history and to tackle alleged “anti-Russian” propaganda that damages the country’s international image. The commission’s mandate is to formulate policy options to “neutralize the negative consequences” of what they consider to be historical falsifications aimed against Russia. This is in particular a response to steps by neighboring governments in Estonia, Poland, Ukraine, and elsewhere to talk openly about Soviet repression and to remove monuments that glorify the Soviet occupation.

The committee has no independent historians, and is comprised of bureaucrats from government ministries, representatives from military and intelligence agencies, several pro-Kremlin spin-doctors, and nationalistic lawmakers.

The chairman of this “historic truth” commission, Sergei Naryshkin, is chief of staff in President Dmitry Medvedev’s administration and a loyal supporter of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. As Russian liberals have pointed out, this commission bears an eerie resemblance to Soviet institutions that established a monopoly over scientific and scholarly truths.

Additionally, legislators from the ruling United Russia Party have proposed amendments to the penal code that will make the “falsification of history” a criminal offence. If passed by the Duma, this could result in mandatory jail terms for anyone in the former Soviet Union convicted of “rehabilitating Nazism.”

This draft bill is not designed to fight neo-Nazis or fascist ideology. Instead, it would allow the criminal prosecution of individuals who question whether the Soviets really “liberated” Eastern Europe toward the end of the war or whether countries such as Georgia welcomed their annexation by the Czarist Empire. This would open the door to possible legal campaigns against political leaders in neighboring countries, including Ukraine, Georgia, and the three Baltic states, who challenge Russia’s distorted version of history.

Last month’s parade, where soldiers in Czarist-style uniforms carried the red flag with the yellow hammer and sickle across the Red Square, was an almost exact reenactment of Soviet-era self-glorification. The spectacle sent an unmistakable message to all formerly occupied territories that Russia remains the strongest military continental power and continues its Czarist and Soviet traditions.

During the May display President Medvedev warned unnamed adversaries who were supposedly contemplating “military adventures” against Russia — a thinly veiled threat to keep Ukraine and Georgia out of NATO. The Kremlin’s new historiography of Russia as a proud, virtuous neighbor to those in its sphere helps provide an intellectual underpinning for such posturing. Western countries, including the former Soviet satellites, can take steps to expose Russia’s historical revisionism by sponsoring international conferences and symposia, by opening up all pertinent state archives to scholars, by educating the younger generation about communist crimes, and simply by talking openly about the Soviet era.

As Russia glosses over its dark past and flexes its muscles, the fear is that those who rewrite history may also be determined to repeat it.

Mr. Bugajski is is director of the New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

  1. 21 Responses to “Empire and Path Dependency (Historical Baggage)”

  2. Dear Dr. Kuzio. The three articles above are too long and disparate to comment on them all in a single post. But please allow me to comment on your introductory remarks.

    “…even moderate Ukrainians believe: Russia refuses, cannot and will not come to terms with Ukrainians as a separate people or Ukraine as an independent nation.” I have yet to see a sociological study showing that Ukrainians don’t see Russia as recognizing Ukraine as an independent nation. The only thing close to such sociological study of Ukrainians’ opinion on that matter that I have seen shows the opposite. Perhaps you are aware that the most popular TV entertainment in Ukraine are political talk shows and they are run by most every national channel. The theme of 2009-05-29 Shuster Live (perhaps the most popular talk show in Ukraine) was the relations between Russia and Ukraine. The in-studio audience of Shuster Live is assembled by one of the leading Ukrainian sociological institutions to be representative of the nation. One hundred volunteers are picked for each show to correspond with Ukraine’s population in every possible way: same gender distribution, same age distribution, same regional (west-center-east-south) distribution, etc. So, the answers of the audience of Shuster Live are more or less representative of the public opinion in Ukraine. And the answers to the question “Why the relations between Russia and Ukraine are worsening?” were distributed as follows.
    1. Due to the pro-American policies of Ukraine 35%
    2. Due to the imperial policies of Russia 33%
    3. Personal dislike between leaders 22%
    4. A fight over language and history 10%
    So, it seems like only one third of Ukrainians see Russian “imperialism, chauvinism, racism” as the major problem obstructing the Russo-Ukrainian relationship. And more Ukrainians see a major cause of these Russo-Ukrainian quarrels in the policies of the Ukrainian leadership. I agree on this with most of the Ukrainians as the Russia’s view towards Ukraine seems driven not by imperialism, chauvinism, racism or them all but by dry pragmatism. Russia is worried not by Ukrainian independence per se but by the possibility of Ukraine carrying out the hostile to Russia foreign policy. This is hardly an incomprehensible position since the prospect of the neighboring country carrying a hostile to you foreign policy (and Russia, justifiably or not, sees NATO as a block hostile to Russia by the block’s very design) would be a cause of concern for any country in the world.

    As for your Scotts in UK comparison, I am afraid discussing the position of Ukrainian elite in the Russia-led empires does not make a good argument to prove the occupation point of view. Scotts may be running the Labour Party, but, for example, Ukrainians in the Russian Empire practically ran an institution of a much greater role for Russia than the Labour Party for the UK, namely the Russian Orthodox Church which was practically dominated by the Ukrainians from accession well into the 18th century. At the same time, the nobility of the Ukrainian origin took many various prominent positions among the empire’s state and military leadership. Similarly, there is no lack of examples of Ukrainians in the Soviet leadership through all 70 years of the country’s existence. Comparison with Ireland misses another important aspect. London never made an attempt to truly integrate Ireland as the latter was viewed more like a colony while the Ukrainian lands were truly integrated in the Russian Empire (as well as in the USSR). The status of the Imperial administrative subdivisions in Ukraine (Governotates), the position of Ukrainian nobility and the Ukrainian lower classes were no different in Ukraine than in the rest of the empire. Ukraine’s resources and its people were exploited for the imperial needs no more and no less than the resources and people of Russia. Finally, the standard of living in Ukraine was similar to that in Russia which all shows that the status of Ukraine within an Empire was that of a fully integrated part of the country rather than of the occupied territory or a colony.

    “To Ukrainians, Russia and the USSR were types of empires.” Perhaps so it was for Ukrainians who belong to a minority nationalist camp but there is no evidence to suggest that all or most of Ukrainians considered Russia as an imperial towards them power with Ukraine being the colony of the latter.

    By Burachek on Jun 13, 2009

  3. Buracheck, a few comments regarding your post.

    1. “Shuster-Live”:
    You wrote – “one of the leading Ukrainian sociological institutions…”
    - Shuster had never unveiled the name of this institution. If you know – inform please.
    “One hundred volunteers are picked…”
    - One can easily estimate the simplest (only math. statistical) error: ~ Square root of N. In the case of 100 participants it is 10%, whereas when he shows separate results for every group (4 regions of Ukraine, age categories, etc.) it runs up to 20%.
    Well, it’s not the greatest sin, and sometimes (rarely) even Shuster comments it as a “trend”. What’s much worse – practically all of our so called “sociology” is not a science as it ought to be. Why? The “human factor error” can be by order of magnitude higher even in natural sciences to say nothing of such as sociology and especially in highly corrupted society.
    Maybe you know (it’s not a secret) that it is common practice among our sociological institutions to produce two types of “results”: one – “custom-manufactured”, i.e. ordered by political parties which pay money to know real state of things (and of course it’s a “busyness secret”) and another type – exposed for public. It’s easy to guess that they may differ substantially both by absolute values and “quality” of questions. Honest scientist working against contract can suspend publishing of results, but he will never publish corrupted data or intentionally give wrong interpretation.
    The form of questions in most TV-shows is highly manipulative, mainly “black-white”; they stimulate people not to think in “weight manner” but rather in “friend-alien” coordinates. Also I think that even most objective polling results may work both for the good of society and “for the bad” – it depends on who and in what way is interpreting them.
    One of examples of our “leading sociologists” is I.Bekeshkina’s paper: – “Ukraine: Failed Democracy” (http://main.pravda.com.ua/news/2009/6/5/96046.htm).

    2. Only short comment on your “…minority nationalist camp”. How do you understand the word “nationalism”? As D.Tabachnik et.al. who hates all Ukrainian? Or like some ordinary “Russian-thinking” who call “nationalists” those who speaks Ukrainian in Ukraine (but in company of so-called Russian-speaking)? Or as O.Tyahnybok? This word is not “black-white”, it has variety of meanings, it’s highly relative and changeable both “in space and time”, and maybe it is due to this it is so “successfully” used in political speculations.

    3. As for “Russians-Ukrainians” relations – both historical and present-day – it’s very complex problem and simplified approach (based on Shuster-like “shows”) cannot work.

    By Yuri_D on Jun 14, 2009

  4. “why are Russia-Ukraine relations worsening”?

    That question, of course, contains a huge assumption.

    But the answers of the audience are revealing:

    1) due to the pro-American policies of Ukraine – 35%

    2) due to the imperialist policies of Russia – 33%

    Those are both the same thing, actually.

    In other words, Russia stamps its feet and pouts and shouts and throws temper tantrums when Russia can’t have its boot on someone else’s throat.

    So if Ukraine does indeed have “pro-American policies” (which I doubt), Russia throws a temper tantrum – because Russia has imperialist policies.

    And there it is again – sovok propaganda:

    - “nationalist”

    - “no evidence”

    I don’t know why little sovoks always resort to the “there is no evidence” crutch – when there is plenty of evidence for whatever the little sovoks are trying to “disprove.”

    Whether the boot on Ukraine’s throat was tsarist or sovok, there is plenty of evidence that Russia’s policies were to eliminate “nationalism” – Ukrainian nationalism. Ukrainian identity, language, culture, history and people.

    Ukraine was severely exploited by imperialist rasha.

    St. Petersburg was built “on the bones of 10,000 Ukrainian Cossacks.”

    Catherine the Prussian imported Germans into Ukraine and Russia – and gave them MORE rights than Ukrainians had.

    Ukrainians had – serfdom.

    Those are just 3 examples.

    “Fully integrated” into the empire.

    Burachek, you need to go peddle your little sovok nonsense somewhere else.

    It’s the same old sovok nonsense, it doesn’t fly, and people are tired of it.

    By elmer on Jun 14, 2009

  5. Dear Yuri,

    on 1 (how representative the answers of the Shuster’s audience are of an overall opinion in Ukraine) please note that I was rather cautious in introducing them. Dr. Kuzio’s comment stated an opinion and simply postulated that this is an opinion in which “even moderate Ukrainians believe”. The latter was given without any supportive data showing that moderate Ukrainians indeed share this view. In my opinion any statement about what the public opinion is should be backed by proper sociological data. I noted that I am not aware of any proper sociological research of Ukrainians’ opinion on whether Russia accepts independent Ukraine or not. I further noted that “the only thing _close_ to such sociological study” is the data from the Shuster’s audience. I am aware of all the pitfalls of manipulative sociology. Personally, I do not believe polling the Shuster’s audience can be substantiated for high-quality sociological research, but it can indeed roughly point out to the trends. If you have any better data, please share it. All I am saying I have not seen anything anywhere that would support the thesis that most Ukrainians think that Russia does not accept the fact that Ukraine is an independent nation.

    On 2 (how I understand the word “nationalism”) I prefer to avoid giving my own definitions to well-established phenomena. I am not familiar with Mr. Tabachnik views, so it is difficult for me to say whether my understanding is similar to his. But to answer your more generalized question, I am unlikely to give much credit to an opinion on Ukraine held by anyone who “hates all Ukrainian”. Also, I don’t buy that there is such thing as “ordinary Russian-thinking”. Thinking can be good or bad but I refuse to define “thinking” in national terms, be it Ukrainian, Russian or whatever. I certainly would not call anyone a nationalist merely for speaking Ukrainian but speaking Ukrainian. We can certainly discuss how it is best to define what constitutes Ukrainian nationalism but it in no way affects the main premise of my comment being that there is no evidence to generalize that the view that Russia was an empire towards them is the view held by most Ukrainians, as Dr. Kusio’s remark implied.

    On 3 (that the relations between Russians and Ukrainians -both historical and present-day – are very complex and a simplified approach cannot work) I fully agree. And the approach based on the view that Russia was an imperial power which held Ukraine “occupied” is precisely such a simplified approach. This is exactly why I expressed my being uncomfortable with the term “occupation” being used passingly as if the applicability of this term is undisputed and long settled just like the occupation of Ukraine by Nazi Germany during the WWII.

    As for Elmer’s comment, it speaks for itself and I don’t think it needs any response.

    By Burachek on Jun 14, 2009

  6. well, Burachok, you are indeed a true sovok.

    2 more sovok “techniques” – denial and arrogance.

    What you don’t like – deny.

    And you want yours to be the only opinion, while offering a pretense of examining “the facts” and the opinions of others.

    For a sovok-brainwashed person like you, the only “occupation” of Ukraine was indeed by Nazis – those big, big boogeymen of sovok propaganda.

    And by “nationalists” like Bandera – another big, big boogeyman for sovoks.

    According to sovoks like you, it was impermissible for Ukrainians like Bandera to occupy their own land – because they did not want to be subservient to sovok roosha.

    You deny what imperial roosha and sovok roosha did to Ukraine, as I mentioned above.

    You are certainly not engaging in any sort of sociologocal or historical research or fact-finding.

    You merely continue to blather your sovok nonsense.

    By elmer on Jun 15, 2009

  7. Dr. Kuzio -

    Further to your observation of the surprisingly lingering after-effects of the sovok era – this article and video from June 16, 2009.

    http://5.ua/newsline/232/0/60217/

    There was a protest in the city of Kherson against sovok era monuments, including one that still stands of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the notorious murderer. Apparently, the monuments number well into the tens.

    Note the video (there is a little camera symbol that links to the video) – some commies came out to shout at the young man standing quietly. Note especially the old babushkas acting like rabid dogs. Note that one of the babushkas points at the cameras – sovok style. Cameras were “very dangerous” in the sovok union.

    This is brainwashing, plain and simple.

    It is obviously not representative of the majority of Ukrainians today – but nevertheless…

    It is no different than defending monuments to Hitler “for historical reasons.”

    It is hideous.

    By elmer on Jun 18, 2009

  8. This is a report and film on Lenin monuments in Kyiv:
    http://www.rferl.org/section/Multimedia/404.html

    In May the president called for all “communist” monuments to be removed. I do not understand the point of calling for this when nothing will be done about it. All that has to be done is for the SBU to organize a group of Tyahnobok’s Svoboda, KUN, SUM and other nationalists to do it in one stroke over one night.

    By Taras Kuzio on Jun 18, 2009

  9. I had seen the report, and I recall Yushchenko’s call for communist monuments to be removed.

    In Western Ukraine, many of them have been removed.

    One interesting thing – sovok era grave monuments have not been removed.

    But it seems that certain grave monuments have had sovok propaganda engraved on the monuments removed from them.

    Inertia – there seems to be a lot of it in Ukraine, unless the activity is using government to rob and steal.

    By elmer on Jun 18, 2009

  10. If I am not mistaken, Kuchma also issued a call to remove Communist monuments. Remember it took the whole of the 1990s for the Hammer and Sickle to be removed from the front of parliament.
    A country that seeks international recognition of the famine as genocide has thousands of monuments up to Lenin and the regime that committed the genocide. An example of multi-vectorism?

    By Taras Kuzio on Jun 18, 2009

  11. Dear Dr. Kuzio,

    I am surprised you were silent when Elmer did his act in your blog employing ethnic slurs and other signs of hatred, but coming back to what you said here, there is a direct connection between the Soviet monument removal and local public sentiment. They are removed precisely in the communities where public does not want them and they stay on where the local public does not want them removed. It seems to me that in democracy the issue of monument should be decided by the local communities rather than central government, don’t you agree?

    I still would be interested to see your response to my earlier comment. Do you still think that Ukrainians, both the lower classes and the nobility, in the Russian Empire were treated by the state significantly differently from their Russian counterparts since this was one of your arguments in support of the view that the term “occupation” applies to the control of Ukraine by the Empire?

    Thank you,

    By Burachek on Jun 19, 2009

  12. “Do you still think that Ukrainians, both the lower classes and the nobility, in the Russian Empire were treated by the state significantly differently from their Russian counterparts since this was one of your arguments in support of the view that the term “occupation” applies to the control of Ukraine by the Empire?” – Burachek

    Of course they were treated differently. In tsarist circles the nobility mostly spoke French, but permitted the celar class Muskovites to carry on in Russian, permitted Russian print, etc. Russian intelligensia was untouched and allowed to flourish (except for the Marxist crowd, but not until they killed the tsar in the mid 1800s).

    In Ukraine, the Russian occupiers did what they could to stamp out the Ukrainian language. The Ukrainian intelligensia was continually persecuted and periodically liquidated by the tsarist state.

    Also note the difference in the way the Moscow patriarkhat was treated (purged, but permitted to exist) vs the Kyivan patriarkhat (exterminated).

    But me thinks you already know that and simply cannot bring yourself to understand the legitimacy of the Ukrainian cause.

    By Bohdan on Jun 19, 2009

  13. In Burachek’s democracy, I think that the people should be allowed to raise a monument to hitler – right in front of Burachek’s house.

    After all, if that is what local people want, then it should be done.

    And Burachek will have a nice monument of hitler to look at all day long – right in front of his house.

    By elmer on Jun 19, 2009

  14. Elmer, your analogy is flawed because it is based on an argument so fictitious that it is absurd. There exists no community in Ukraine, eastern or western, that revers Hitler and would erect a monument to him. Hitler is universally despised everywhere in the world. Same can’t be said about figures you seem to despise. I am not judging your views. I am simply stating plain facts. It so happens that not every controversial historical figure is universally despised because many of them are seen differently by different people depending on what part of their legacy appeals to the heart of a particular community. For example Russians revere and erect monuments to Suvorov for the victories of the Russian army achieved under his command while Poles see him as a person responsible for the Praga massacre in 1794 (despite there is no evidence that the massacre was ordered by Suvorov.) Another example, to this day there is a lot of respect to Napoleon Bonaparte in France where his monuments are not under any danger of demolition while there is none (and there can’t be) in Russia or in England. Or returning back home, Catherine the Great is mainly viewed by some people in Ukraine through a prism of her crushing of Sich and the remnants of the Ukrainian autonomy while others primarily see her role in founding of their their city or community. BTW, Catherine is also highly regarded by the descendants of the Zaporozhian Cossacks who now comprise the majority in Kuban. In fact, Kuban Cossacks came all the way to Odessa to protect her monument during recent infamous events. Same can be said of the UPA leaders. While for some their commitment to Ukrainian independence trumps whatever crimes they are responsible for, for others it is the war crimes committed by the Ukrainian nationalist formations during the war under such leaders is what defines their attitude to these historic figures.

    Ukraine, being a multinational and multicultural country, lacks an ideology that would be universally embraced by most of its population, Ukrainian nationalism remains a minority faith in the country and controversial figures, be it Catherine II, Peter I, Petlura, Shukhevych etc. are viewed differently in different regions of the country. So, Odessans erected a monument to Catherine the Great for her role in the historic events that brought about the foundation of their city and the monument to Peter I of Russia remains in place in Poltava. And while in Western Ukraine the UPA leaders are commemorated in stone and in local topography for their commitment to the idea of achieving the Ukrainian independence whatever the cost, the Eastern Ukrainian as well as Polish communities erect monuments to UPA victims (which were many). And everyone is right here in their own ways.

    The silliest thing for a central authority would be to impose certain views nationwide over all people as this would further destabilize such a multicultural country as Ukraine. There are virtually no Soviet monuments left in western Ukraine (and that reflects the local sentiment there) while in Eastern Ukraine the local communities express no wish to part with this part of their history. I am surprised that any person who proclaims his respect to democracy and freedom of expression would actually advocate governmental imposition of certain ideology upon the population. Such an idea reminds me more of Soviet totalitarianism than any model of a free society we attempt to build in Ukraine. I hope Dr. Kuzio’s earlier suggestion that SBU should covertly rally the nationalist extremists to “deal” with Soviet monuments in Ukraine was made jokingly. In fact, I hope that covert alliances between the state security apparatus and the extremist organizations would become history. At least, there should be none in my opinion.

    Bohdan, unfortunately you answered a different question from the one I asked. I did not mean to say that the Moscow rule was beneficial for the Ukrainians. It is a question for the alternate history writers whether remaining under the Polish domination instead of falling under the Russian one would have been more beneficial for Ukraine (independence was not in any realistic picture at the time.) For some patent Russophobes the answer of Russia vs Poland question is perhaps clear but, thanks god, hard-core fanatics of any sort do not dominate the historic thought even though there are some even in academia. However, my question was not whether Moscow authorities treated Ukrainians “well” or “badly” but whether they treated them better or worse than they treated Russians.

    True, the regime did not tolerate the ideological dissent. Pushkin was treated harshly by a regime for his position towards the regime’s autocracy were deemed dangerous just like Kostomarov who dared to challenge the ideology of single unified Russian nation. Both suffered the same fate and were exiled regardless of their popular standing among the intelligentsia. The idea of the separate from Russian Ukrainian language was viewed by the regime as dangerous as it challenged the territorial integrity of the Empire. No wonder it was not well received by the authorities no different than the reception of the criticism of autocracy or of a social order in the empire.

    My point, Bohdan, is different. Yes, Ukrainians who challenged the regime suffered from it just the same as did the Russians who challenged it. But the rest of Ukrainians received the same treatment as their Russian peers. Indigenous Ukrainian nobility received the same status in the society enjoyed by the Russian nobility and the Ukrainian peasantry suffered the same exact serfdom as the Russian one (and, btw, it was not any better than the condition of serfs in Ukraine under Polish domination prior to the accession.) Ukrainian elite that did not challenge the regime had no obstacles in the Empire for the career advancement. For good 200 years Ukrainian clerics dominated the Russian Orthodox Church while educated Ukrainian nobles reached the highest positions in the Imperial civil and military political establishment. Such things cannot be said about the fate of , say, Irish people in the UK and this is why calling the regime in Ukraine as “occupation” is at least questionable.

    By Burachek on Jul 6, 2009

  15. Buachek, you took a long time to say nothing. Everyone can’t be right.

    lenin and his monuments don’t fit in with democracy. Period. Neither does hitler.

    Catherine was Prussian, not Russian. She kept Ukrainians in serfdom, while granting land rights and all sorts of other rights to Germans to induce them to come to Ukraine and Russia. That doesn’t fit in with democracy either.

    It is absurd for a democratic government to erect or maintain monuments to tyrants.

    And that’s the issue – the power, and the responsibility of government.

    The baggage left over in Ukraine, thanks to Russia both from imperial times and sovok times, is that government had all the power, but no accountability and no responsibility.

    It’s time to get rid of all of that baggage in Ukraine.

    The Russians – well, they can rot in their own misery. They’re always done a fine job of it, and they’re doing a fine job of it now.

    The task is to confine Russian misery to where it belongs – Russia.

    By elmer on Jul 7, 2009

  16. Elmer, I find it ironic that you invoke a word “Democracy” to argue your views while, sadly, you totally lack any understanding of the word you use. Perhaps you should educate yourself on what the meaning of this term is, especially since the concept of democracy, established since the times of Plato, is one of the most basic concepts in the modern society. The meaning of democracy, Elmer, is that the control of authority comes from the public, rather than the small part of the public that agrees with you. So, what monuments fit in with democracy gets decided by local communities that expresses their opinions either directly, through a referendum, or through the democratically elected legislatures, local in this case. It so happens, that in different parts of Ukraine different historical figures get public respect and are considered worthy to be embodied in stone. To an average Crimean or Odessan the monument to Shukhevych or Bandera is no less offensive than the monument to Catherine II or Peter I to an average Galician or to yourself. This is precisely why there are no monuments to Bandera in Odessa and there are no monuments to Catherine in Galicia but vice versa. Yours or anyone’s fixation on the monuments to figures you find particularly disagreeable cannot be imposed on the Ukrainian communities precisely because Ukraine now IS a democracy (albeit an imperfect one). It would be a true tragedy for Ukraine if people with authoritarian views who think, just like you, that they get to impose their preferences over the whole country get the power again. Luckily, the authoritarian politicians in Ukraine from both sides of the political spectrum do not get much traction in elections with the Ternopil Oblast recent election being the only, though frightening, exception.

    I am also saddened to see a strong and irrational Russophobia sticking like a sour thumb from most every your post. And this reminds me of the question asked earlier by Yuri_D in his post of Jun 14 above. He asked ‘How do you understand the word “nationalism”?’ Luckily, we do not need to invent the definitions of a well established political terms, such as Nationalism, or its particular application to Ukraine. There is a great book devoted to the Ukrainian Nationalism in post-Soviet Ukraine written recently by Andrew Wilson. I am not sure you, Elmer, are familiar with many academic books on the Ukrainian history since you seem to base your opinions on your political views rather than the facts, but Dr. Kuzio, I am sure, is aware of the Wilson’s book “Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith” published by Cambridge University Press. So, in this book Wilson states the obvious that the disparate Ukrainian nationalists are united by three common traits “the special rights of ethnic Ukrainian indigenes, the unique status and special suffering of the Ukrainian people and the inevitability of cultural and political conflict with Russia”. Your endless invocation of the unique suffering of Ukrainians in the hands of the evil Russians as well as the obvious hatred of Russia and frequent ressentiment towards anything Russian expressed in your posts greatly undermine the credibility of other things you are trying to say. So, you might consider toning down the ant-Russian rants in the future. I must note, though, that your irrational Russophobia is very rare among the Ukrainians, as we are a very tolerant nation overall, and this addresses the point I raised in my earlier post in this very thread that such aggressive nationalists like yourself do not speak for all Ukrainian despite they try to pretend the opposite.

    By Burachek on Aug 9, 2009

  17. Wilson’s book was negatively reviewed everywhere, including by myself in International Affairs. After this review he refused to include his name as joint author on the second issue of Ukraine. Perestroika to Independence in 2000. The first issue published in 1994 had both names. So much for tolerance of criticism.
    wilson’s book (his LSE PhD) was notable for being russophile and lacking in theoretical and comparative knowledge of nationalism.
    “Nationalism” is a notoriously very difficult concept to define as it appears through every political ideology from communism to fascism. Some examples of this being discussed are (The Myth of the Civic State):
    http://www.taraskuzio.net/Nation%20and%20State%20Building_files/national-myth.pdf

    See also my criticism of Wilson and other russophiles on their application of nationalism to Ukraine:
    http://www.taraskuzio.net/Nation%20and%20State%20Building_files/national-states.pdf

    I agree that widespread anti-Russian feelings are absent in Ukraine, if one understands them as seen in the Ukrainian diaspora. But, this most people understand as anti-Russian feelings along ethnic-cultural lines. Anti-Russian criticism of Russia along territorial-state lines are more difficult to define but exist. Most Ukrainians are very critical of Russian policies to Ukraine which are done in patriotic, territorial derzhavnytske tones.

    This is not different to Scotland and Ireland most of whose populations speak English. But, Scots and Irish patriots have strong criticisms about England and Britain.

    On a final note, Wilson’s 1997 book Ukrainian Nationalism. A Minority Faith was undermined by the 2004 Orange Revolution that showed that Ukrainian nationalism was a majority faith. And, guess who rushed to get a book out to prove it – the same Wilson. Both him and Dominique Arel (also with same russophile views in the 1990s on Ukrainian nationalism) changed their views from around 2001 onwards when they saw that those they disparaged as “Ukrainian nationalists” were actually the main bulwark against autocracy and support for democracy in Ukraine. As seen in the Ukraine Without Kuchma, Arise Ukraine! and Orange Revolution protests.

    By Taras on Aug 10, 2009

  18. Dear Dr. Kuzio, thanks for your response.

    Unfortunately, I don’t see any basis of fact in your assertion that the Orange Revolution proves the popularity of the Ukrainian nationalism among the Ukrainians. The Orange Revolution was a democratic revolution rather than a nationalist one and it succeeded thanks to the people in the Ukrainian capital like myself who held the ground for several days until Yushchenko’s supporters from other regions joined. I can assure you that we would have never taken it to the streets for the nationalist ideas but it was the election fraud that infuriated us. Had Yanukovych won the election fair and square, we would have never protested against the election outcome. And if, god forbids, he indeed wins the next election (which seems possible) there would be no strong public protests in Kiev despite Kievans in their majority would not vote for him.

    I can add one more thing. The 2004 Yushchenko was a lot different from Yushchenko we know today. Back then he was doing everything possible to distance himself from the nationalists precisely because in Ukrainian politics to be perceived a nationalist is a kiss of death in the national election (it does not hurt in some regional election though). During the election campaign Yushchenko pledged to never ever close Russian schools and in his TV ad he explicitly stated that this is a local community issue. He also pledged to never interfere into the church affairs and after one particularly xenophobic speech of Mr. Tyahnybok Yushchenko expelled Tyahnybok from Nasha Ukraina parliamentary faction. From the policies pursued by Yushchenko in the office it is now clear that his inclusionist and uniter not a divider rhetoric was just as much a lie as similar election rhetoric of one well-known US politician but back then many Ukrainians were misled. Besides, we did not have much of a choice as an alternative of more years of Kuchma seemed just horrible.

    Also note that despite all Yushchenko’s attempts to distance himself from the nationalist ideas that he later implemented in his policies, he still won the election by a margin of only 8 percent against the convicted criminal precisely because his opponents’ campaign to paint Yushchenko as a nationalist was partially successful and Ukrainians just do not elect the nationalist politicians.

    On a side note, this is the reason of the current Tymoshenko’s success in the Ukrainian democratic camp. Unlike Yushchenko, Tymoshenko does not hold any nationalist views, which makes her electable. But back to the Orange Revolution, perhaps you were not there back then but my family was there and you might be interested to know that Maidan was Russophone for at least 2-3 days and even after that when protester from other regions joined the Maidan remained mostly Russophone because to a large degree it was still composed from Kievans most of who speak Russian in their everyday lives. The miserable performance of Mr. Tyahnybok’s party in Kiev is just another proof that nationalist ideas just do not fly among the Kievans, the very same ones who made the Orange Revolution a reality.

    By Burachek on Aug 10, 2009

  19. You are making exactly the same mistake as Arel and Wilson in equating nationalism with language and culture. I do not. Nationalism in Scotland for example is territorial and historical, not on language. As Arel said in his Cambridge University lecture, the Orange Revolution was the triumph of Ukrainian nationalism if understood as pro-Western, democratic, patriotic, territorial and (for Western Ukrainians) cultural.
    Another way of looking at it is by reading Shulman in Slavic Review where he talks of Ukraine’s two identities: ethnic Ukrainian and eastern Slavic. This roughly equates to Yushchenko versus Yanukovych in 2004. Ethnic Ukrainian identity is supportive of democracy, eastern Slavic is less so.
    These are broad categories that include different sub groups.
    As to Yushchenko – he never fulfilled 90% of his 2004 programme. This though is a general problem of lack of accountability of Ukrainian politicians.

    As to BYuT – it includes both national democrats and centrists. Former UNA-UNSO leader Shkil is a member. Yushchenko’s problem is that he has pushed himself too far into a western Ukrainian defined nationalist corner and thereby losing his central Ukrainian more moderate nationalist niche. Tymoshenko has done the opposite and has to now rebuild her support in western Ukraine.
    But, of them all Yatseniuk is the biggest opportunist. In 2007 he was in OU-PSD first five and his presidential election programme negates everything OU-PSD stood for.

    By Taras Kuzio on Aug 10, 2009

  20. I largely agree with your assessment of Yatsenyuk. As for the first part of your post, I think it is rather fruitless to carry a terminological argument. If there is no consensus over the meaning of the term, it is useless to discuss the implications of such term. I just want to note that if you define the Ukrainian nationalism as more of a simply pro-western democratic movement, you will find it difficult to reconcile such view with those in Ukraine who consider themselves Ukrainian nationalists as their agenda (that you can find in openly published articles of Svoboda leaders) includes allocation of ethnic quotas for non-Ukrainians in the employment and public education, language restrictions on the privately owned media, etc, which is hardly “democratic” or “pro-western”.

    But I also have a question on your description of BYuT’s composition. Who are the “national democrats” that along with “centrists” comprise BYuT’s base. I understand the term “Democrat” but what is the meaning of “National Democrat” is still puzzling to me. I saw the term used before and always wondered how the “democrat” can be qualified as “national” that is who are those democrats who aren’t “national democrats”?

    By Burachek on Aug 10, 2009

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    By Rengenx on Feb 14, 2010

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