Soviet and Nazi Crimes are no Different

July 1, 2009 – 12:14 am

You can’t be half pregnant or half drunk. If you want to remove the stain of totalitarianism you need to remove Nazi and Soviet idols to totalitarianism. Yushchenko’s only fault is that he did not go all the way in stating that Ukraine suffered terribly from the worlds two evil ideologies: Nazism and Communism (see Tim Snyder’s excellent article).

New York Review of Books 56, number 12 (July 16, 2009)
Holocaust: The Ignored Reality
by Timothy Snyder (Yale University)
Though Europe thrives, its writers and politicians are preoccupied with
death. The mass killings of European civilians during the 1930s and
1940s are the reference of today’s confused discussions of memory, and
the touchstone of whatever common ethics Europeans may share…
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22875

BBC, Kyiv:
Ukraine wary of KGB terror files
Ukraine is opening up part of its old KGB archive, declassifying hundreds of thousands of documents spanning the entire Soviet period.

But the move to expose Soviet-era abuses is dividing Ukrainians, the BBC’s Gabriel Gatehouse reports from Kiev.

Deep in the bowels of Ukraine’s former KGB headquarters there is a deathly silence. Thousands of boxes, piled floor to ceiling, line the walls. Each box is carefully numbered and each one contains hundreds of documents: case notes on enemies of the former Soviet state.

Behind each number, there is a story of personal tragedy.

Volodymyr Viatrovych, the chief archivist, pulled out a brown cardboard folder stuffed full of documents: case number 4076. At the centre of the case is a letter, dated 1940 and addressed to “Comrade Stalin, the Kremlin, Moscow”.

“Dear Iosif Vissarionovich,” the letter starts. Nikolai Reva wanted Stalin to know the facts about the great famine of 1932-33, when millions died as a result of the Soviet policy of forced collectivisation.

Like many at the time, Mr Reva believed that Stalin was being kept in the dark, and that if only he knew what was happening, he would surely put a stop to it.

But his letter landed him in the Gulag. He was eventually rehabilitated - 25 years later.

Many met a harsher fate.

Leafing through one of many macabre photo albums, Mr Viatrovych pointed to a picture of Ivan Severin, shot in the head by the Soviet security services. Under the picture, in very neat handwriting, is written: “Liquidated, 3 April 1947“.

Criminal prosecution

Mr Viatrovych and his team are helping people to find out what happened to relatives and loved ones, often decades after they disappeared.

But the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), now in charge of the files, is declassifying them selectively.

They are concentrating on older cases, like that of the “liquidated” Mr Severin, who was part of a guerrilla campaign against Soviet rule in western Ukraine after World War II.

The authorities are preparing to mount a criminal prosecution in relation to the famine, or Holodomor , as it is known in Ukraine, though it is doubtful whether there is anyone still alive to stand in the dock.

But SBU head Valentyn Nalyvaichenko hopes this is just the beginning.

“As soon as Russia starts to open and uncover its archives, there will be more and more truth about the real history,” he said. At the moment, he added, Russia is not being especially co-operative.

But there is another obstacle to complete disclosure, and that is the Ukrainian Security Service itself. They are the ones deciding which files to declassify.

I put it to Mr Nalyvaichenko that the SBU is, after all, a successor to the KGB. He came out on the defensive.

“First and most important for me - we are not a successor to the KGB. That’s according to the law,” he said.

Could he state categorically that no-one working for the SBU today had formerly worked for the KGB?

He could not, admitting that 20% of his employees were former KGB officers. Some analysts in Ukraine believe that is a conservative figure.

It seems unlikely that SBU officers who worked for the Soviet KGB in the 1970s and 80s will be enthusiastic about declassifying documents that could incriminate them. Even if, as Mr Nalyvaichenko pointed out, the SBU is trying to recruit younger staff.

‘Not worth it’

But not all young Ukrainians have an exclusively negative view of their 20th-Century history.

“ To start a process of lustration after 18 years of independence would lead society to the brink of civil war ”
Dmytro Tabachnyk Historian and opposition MP
In Kiev, there is a vast monument to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany: a sprawling bronze relief of soldiers bearing guns and bayonets.

“We love our history,” said Svitlana, a young schoolteacher from the southern city of Odessa, on an outing with her class.

She was not keen for the children in her charge to be forced to examine the darker chapters of Soviet history.

“The past is the past,” she said. “The history of the famine, the killings, all the things Stalin did. I don’t think we should bring them up. There’s enough violence today as it is. If we start blaming each other… It’s just not worth it.”

‘Witch hunt’

The idea of airing the past as part of a healing process, and excluding members of the former regime from positions of authority - a process known as “lustration” - is being actively promoted by some in the Ukrainian administration.

But it is highly controversial. Dmytro Tabachnyk, a historian and opposition lawmaker, thinks the notion is absurd.

“It’s a witch hunt,” he said. “To start a process of lustration after 18 years of independence would lead society to the brink of civil war.”

In a forest just outside Kiev, the tree trunks are tied with thousands of white scarves.

The scarves are embroidered in the traditional Ukrainian way, with red-and-black geometric patterns, and each one symbolically represents a life lost to Soviet oppression.

Under Stalin, the Soviet secret police would bury executed political prisoners at Bykivnia. No-one knows exactly how many bodies lie buried in this wood, but some estimates put the figure at more than 200,000.

But, says Nico Lange, the German director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Kiev, Ukrainians must stop blaming the Russians for their past, and start looking inward.

“Ukrainians have a tendency to perceive themselves as only victims of those historical processes,” he says.

“But coming to terms with the past really starts when you start uncovering also your own involvement: the oppressions by your own state, the offenders who are from your own people. If you do this work, this very painful work, the truth will finally set you free. And you will not invite new dictators to oppress you again.”

The Germans have experience of confronting their own past, both following World War II, and after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

But it will take a lot of united political will for such a process to get under way in Ukraine.

And it may be that, for the moment, there are still too many people alive and in positions of power, who were involved with the Soviet regime in one way or another.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/8119320.stm

Published: 2009/06/29 00:51:16 GMT

© BBC MMIX

Empire and Path Dependency (Historical Baggage)

June 12, 2009 – 4:09 pm

When we talk about empire and path dependency we need to take into account the central issue that even moderate Ukrainians believe: Russia refuses, cannot and will not come to terms with Ukrainians as a separate people or Ukraine as an independent nation.
Imperialism, chauvinism, racism? Probably all. And, do not think I am a typical russophobe diaspornyk, as I am not. I can differentiate between people and leaders/regime.
Ukraine and Russia’s 1654 union has been compared to the 1707 union of Scotland and England. There is simply no comparison. Muscovy (Russia then) saw 1654 as Ukraine submitting itself to annexation. Ukraine saw it as a military alliance of equals. Scotland had an equal relationship with England and Scots were in the leadership of Britain (English Canada is largely Empire Loyalists fleeing the American Revolution most of whom are Lowland Scots and Ulster Scots. Canada is the only country outside Scotland with its own tartan. The GB Labour Party is run by Scots! Ukraine fared far worse than Scotland, more like Ireland within the British empire.
Remember that empires are relative. To a Breton, France was an empire. To a Frenchman, central policies in all outlying provinces was “nation-building”. To Ukrainians, Russia and the USSR were types of empires. To Russians, who believe Ukrainians are Little Russians, as Putin quoted Denikin recently, then central policies in Ukraine were not imperialist but “Russian nation building” to create a Ruskie narod from 3 eastern Slavic peoples.

Anyway, 3 pieces on this question for food of thought:

Ukrainian Intelligence Promotes Lustration in Ukraine
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35090

EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
June 12, 2009—Volume 6, Issue 113

IN THIS ISSUE
Russian intelligence intensifies its activities in Ukraine

Russia’s Ideological Crusade Against Ukraine
–Taras Kuzio

According to an interview with Ukraine’s Ambassador to Russia Konstantyn Hryshchenko, the country’s bilateral relationship with Russia has sunk to its lowest level since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, testimony to the Russian state control of the media and its ideological crusade against Ukraine (www.profil-ua.com, June 6). In the weekly Glavred magazine on May 20 its front cover declared: “Beware Ukrainophobia!”

The Levada Center recently found that 62 percent of Russians hold a negative view of Ukraine with only the United States and Georgia being seen in a worse light. At the same time, 91 percent of Ukrainians hold positive views of Russia, a reflection of media pluralism and the lack of state directed propaganda against Russia. Analyzing these polls, the head of the Center for Military-Political Research in Kyiv summarized this relationship in his headline: “We like them but they do not like us” (www.pravda.com.ua, May 5).

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) is openly raising the question of the intensification of Russian intelligence activities within Ukraine, and Russia’s return to Soviet KGB tactics. This concern was expressed in SBU chairman Valentyn Nalyvaychenko’s comment that the FSB within the Black Sea Fleet should withdraw from the Crimea (www.radiosvoboda, June 2). Nalyvaychenko explained that one of the functions of the SBU was counter-espionage, and that was why they did not agree with the FSB being based in the Fleet.

The main suspects of the murder in Odessa on April 17 of a student member of the Ukrainian nationalist NGO Sich, Maksym Chayka, belong to the “Antifa(scist)” NGO financed by the Russian nationalist Rodina party. The presidential secretariat requested that the SBU investigate their activities to discover if they are coordinated “with foreign organizations of an anti-Ukrainian orientation” (www.president.gov.ua, April 22). The SBU appealed to the justice ministry to consider if there were grounds to revoke Rodina’s registration, based on among things, their link to organized crime and financing from abroad. The suspects have fled to Russia.

The conflict between the Sich and Antifa NGO’s is historically based; specifically the controversy surrounding the unveiling of a monument to Empress Catherine in Odessa in October 2007. Ambassador Hryshchenko pointed out that unlike the constant Russian interference in Ukraine, Kyiv does not protest against Russian glorification of Tsar Peter and Tsarina Catherine -even though both are regarded very negatively in Ukraine. Ukrainian history equates both Russian leaders as the destroyers of the Ukrainian autonomous Hetmanate in the late eighteenth century and the re-organization of Ukrainian territories into gubernia, as well as the introduction of serfdom and the banning of the Ukrainian language.

The Russian foreign ministry assumes the right to condemn the unveiling of monuments to historical figures in Ukraine. For example, Ukraine will unveil a monument to Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa on Independence Day (August 24) in his home region of Poltava on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, where Ukrainian-Swedish forces were defeated by Russia. Mazepa has undergone rehabilitation as a hero in independent Ukraine, and his picture is displayed on the 10 hryvnia note.

The Russian Orthodox Church imposed an “anathema” on Mazepa and he was condemned as a “traitor” to Russian-Ukrainian unity by tsars and commissars alike. The on-going furore has led to a split within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) with Metropolitan Dmytruk, the head of the UOC’s foreign relations, supporting the growing call to remove the church’s anathema (www.pravda.com.ua, May 26).

Russia’s new historiography incorporates additional Russian chauvinists, such as White Army General Anton Denikin. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s recent reference to Denikin’s description of Russia and Ukraine as “great” and “little” Russia shows the degree to which these Russian views of Ukraine remain deep seated. Putin’s use of “little Russia” infuriated all shades of Ukrainian opinion. As Ukrainian historians pointed out, Denikin hated “Ukrainian separatism” more than he did the Bolsheviks, and this was his undoing. Denikin’s march on Moscow was foiled by uprisings in Ukraine, where his forces terrorized everything Ukrainian (www.unian.net, May 28).

Memoirs published in the West after the Russian revolution by white Russian émigrés described “Ukrainian separatism” as an “Austrian” plot against Russia. “Ukrainian separatism” in the 1990’s evolved into a “Western plot,” while two thirds of Russians in January 2005 believed that the Orange Revolution was an “American conspiracy” (see the critical review of the new anti-Ukrainian book “American Salo [pork fat]” www.unian.net, May 29).

These views of Ukraine’s “artificiality” and “fragility” remain deeply rooted within the Russian mindset, and explain the state orchestrated campaign depicting Ukraine as a “failed state” that requires international supervision. Putin described Ukraine as an “artificial” entity with lands given to it by Russia and the USSR during his speech to the NATO-Russia Council in Bucharest in April 2008. The March 16 issue of Russian political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky’s Ruskyi Zhurnal was devoted to “Will Ukraine Lose its Sovereignty?” (www.russ.ru).

Ukraine’s former Ambassador to the United States Yuriy Shcherbak, wrote a lengthy analysis of the campaign conducted by senior Russian officials. Shcherbak believes that the aim is an “ideological-propaganda preparation of a future operation for the seizure of the territory of a sovereign state” (Den, May 26).

One of the Russian officials named by Shcherbak was the director of the Institute for CIS Countries Konstantin Zatulin, who recently called upon Russia to see ethnic Russians in Ukraine “in the same rank as the army, the fleet and church” (www.russkie.org). Zatulin was again denied entry to Ukraine at Simferopol airport. The SBU spokesperson explained this by saying that Zatulin remained on a banned list of Russians entering Ukraine. More importantly, “The stance of the SBU on this question is very tough: independent of the citizenship and position held (of the person) there is no place in Ukraine for separatists and extremists” (www.pravda.com.ua, June 6).

In their rush to “reset” the button with Russia after its invasion of Georgia and Barack Obama’s election, Brussels and Washington have ignored Russia’s ideological crusade against Ukraine. They should heed the warning from Ambassador Shcherbak, who believes Russia’s ultimate aim is to “destroy Ukrainian statehood” (Den, May 26).

* The Wall Street Journal

* OPINION EUROPE
* JUNE 11, 2009

Kremlin’s Crimes
Is Russia determined to repeat its history?

By JANUSZ BUGAJSKI From today’s Wall Street Journal Europe.

As European democracies celebrate the 20th anniversary of their liberation from communism and the Soviets, Moscow seeks to restore its dominance over former satellites. Rewriting Russian history is part of this plan. The Putinist notion of a progressive Soviet system in the past is designed to provide justification for Russia’s current assertiveness in the region.

Take Moscow’s annual May 9 parade, which celebrates the “victory over fascism” on the anniversary of Nazi Germany’s surrender to the Allies. The entire exercise is based on a monumental national delusion fostered by the Kremlin. Although Russia was one of the victorious powers at the end of World War II, Moscow continues to disguise the historic record that the Soviet Union itself helped launch the war in close alliance with Nazi Germany. Through the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, Stalin schemed with Hitler to carve up Eastern Europe.

Russia has recently intensified its revisionist campaign, claiming that it voluntarily gave up communism and the Soviet Bloc and that the Cold War ended in a draw with the West. Russia’s state propagandists maintain that the USSR never occupied its neighboring states after World War II, but rather liberated them from tyranny. And they minimize the Kremlin’s imposition of a totalitarian system over the region that stifled its political and economic progress for almost half a century. Unlike post-war Germany, Moscow has never paid reparations for Soviet crimes and expropriations in Central and Eastern Europe.

Moscow also disguises the fact that Stalin murdered more Russians and other Soviet citizens than Nazi Germany. Its official figure of 27 million war dead includes several millions of Stalin’s victims during Soviet civilian deportations and military purges.

Instead of admitting that it was a perpetrator and an opportunist in the destruction of Europe, Russia, as the successor state to the Soviet Union, depicts itself as a victim and a victor.

Moscow took another step to revise its history last month when it formed a presidential inter-departmental commission to promote the Soviet version of history and to tackle alleged “anti-Russian” propaganda that damages the country’s international image. The commission’s mandate is to formulate policy options to “neutralize the negative consequences” of what they consider to be historical falsifications aimed against Russia. This is in particular a response to steps by neighboring governments in Estonia, Poland, Ukraine, and elsewhere to talk openly about Soviet repression and to remove monuments that glorify the Soviet occupation.

The committee has no independent historians, and is comprised of bureaucrats from government ministries, representatives from military and intelligence agencies, several pro-Kremlin spin-doctors, and nationalistic lawmakers.

The chairman of this “historic truth” commission, Sergei Naryshkin, is chief of staff in President Dmitry Medvedev’s administration and a loyal supporter of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. As Russian liberals have pointed out, this commission bears an eerie resemblance to Soviet institutions that established a monopoly over scientific and scholarly truths.

Additionally, legislators from the ruling United Russia Party have proposed amendments to the penal code that will make the “falsification of history” a criminal offence. If passed by the Duma, this could result in mandatory jail terms for anyone in the former Soviet Union convicted of “rehabilitating Nazism.”

This draft bill is not designed to fight neo-Nazis or fascist ideology. Instead, it would allow the criminal prosecution of individuals who question whether the Soviets really “liberated” Eastern Europe toward the end of the war or whether countries such as Georgia welcomed their annexation by the Czarist Empire. This would open the door to possible legal campaigns against political leaders in neighboring countries, including Ukraine, Georgia, and the three Baltic states, who challenge Russia’s distorted version of history.

Last month’s parade, where soldiers in Czarist-style uniforms carried the red flag with the yellow hammer and sickle across the Red Square, was an almost exact reenactment of Soviet-era self-glorification. The spectacle sent an unmistakable message to all formerly occupied territories that Russia remains the strongest military continental power and continues its Czarist and Soviet traditions.

During the May display President Medvedev warned unnamed adversaries who were supposedly contemplating “military adventures” against Russia — a thinly veiled threat to keep Ukraine and Georgia out of NATO. The Kremlin’s new historiography of Russia as a proud, virtuous neighbor to those in its sphere helps provide an intellectual underpinning for such posturing. Western countries, including the former Soviet satellites, can take steps to expose Russia’s historical revisionism by sponsoring international conferences and symposia, by opening up all pertinent state archives to scholars, by educating the younger generation about communist crimes, and simply by talking openly about the Soviet era.

As Russia glosses over its dark past and flexes its muscles, the fear is that those who rewrite history may also be determined to repeat it.

Mr. Bugajski is is director of the New European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

Changing the Constitution in Election Year

June 9, 2009 – 11:53 am

Both Yushchenko and Yanukovych want to change the constitution prior to the elections:

http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2009/6/9/96219.htm
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2009/6/9/96207.htm

Parliamentarism a Good Thing for Ukraine?

June 9, 2009 – 11:27 am

http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2009/6/9/96178.htm

Andreas Umland’s support for parliamentarism is backed by the majority of Western political scientists.

This is what Andreas wrote to me last week:

Professor Robert Elgie and political researcher Sophia Moestrup edited the collected volume Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008) containing research papers by specialists on post-Soviet institutional design and performance in Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Elgie’s and Moestrup’s book confirms earlier studies concerning the political system that Ukraine inherited when acquiring independence 1991. Reviewing the results of the country case studies by the various specialists on Central-Eastern Europe, Elgie and Moestrup conclude that, Œwhere semi-presidentialism did have an impact [Š], then more often than not its effect was somewhat negative, or at least unhelpful to the democratisation process. [Š] [T]he unhelpful impact of semi-presidentialism was particularly clear in the case of highly presidentialised semi-presidentialism (like Ukraine had until 2005) and the balanced presidential-prime ministerial semi-presidentialism (as Ukraine had from 2006)¹ (p. 257). The editors concluded that, Œif democracy is fragile, then semi-presidentialism of any form is probably best avoided¹ (p. 257).

Andreas Umland

Tymoshenko and Yanukovych Statements (videos)

June 7, 2009 – 4:22 pm

http://5.ua/newsline/179/0/60014/
Tymoshenko

http://5.ua/newsline/179/0/60008/
Yanukovych